John Steinbeck Essays - Dust Bowl, John Steinbeck,

John Steinbeck John Steinbeck, a twentieth century author, was the beneficiary of various honors including the Nobel Prize. Steinbeck, a moderate that esteemed the old America, could deliver pages of magnificence followed by pages of sheer junk composing utilizing explicit qualities, which his work is described by. John Steinbeck's work is portrayed by imagery and moral story, which can be found in his books The Pearl, The Grapes ofWrath, and his short story ?Flight.? In his short story, Flight, John Steinbeck utilizes numerous instances of imagery, which is one way you can portray John Steinbecks' work. Imagery can be an individual, spot, or thing used to depict something past itself. The most more than once utilized image in ?Flight? is the shading dark. In writing numerous writers utilize the shading dark to speak to death. In his short story, ?Flight,? Steinbeck has various instances of shading imagery. A couple of models are the dark handle on the long sharp edge, Pepe's dark hair, and the dark jerky. Another model might be discovered when Pep? puts on his dads dark coat, which speaks to death. When Pep? puts on the coat he is truly covering himself with death. Another fine model is the path where Pep? ventures. Steinbeck portrays the way as a very much worn dark way. By going on this way he is in reality taking the street of death. Besides Pep's? appearance additionally anticipates the completion. Steinbeck portrays him as having a dark cap that covers his dark covered hair. Kick? is additionally portrayed as being dim, lean and tall. Another model is Pep's? shack. The shack is portrayed as endured and old. It throws a fairly huge shadow toward the Northeast. The dimness of the shadow represents passing in the home. As we can promptly observe, the creators utilization of dark imagery in the story discloses to us that the primary character, Pep?, is looming passing (pg. 225). Another type of imagery that Steinbeck uses, which is additionally in ?Flight,? is nature imagery. All through the story he utilizes nature to represent an assortment of things. A case of nature imagery is water, which is utilized to speak to life. A few models in the short story ?Flight? are Pepes' water sack that he hung over his ponies' shoulder, which started to spill, representing Pepes' life releasing endlessly. Another model is when Pepe was voyaging he began near the stream and got further and further away as he voyaged, representing escaping from life (pg. 225). Heading is another image Steinbeck utilizes, which is in ?Flight? also. In ?Flight? heading is utilized to represent positive and pejorative impacts. North and East are by and large great bearings. Numerous individuals feel this came about when the early man saw the sun ascend in the East. Despite what might be expected, the headings South and West are for the most part terrible bearings. Essentially this is on the grounds that the sun sets in the West. The bearing up, which is likewise the best approach to paradise is by and large great, while down, the course of heck, is viewed as terrible. A case of this type of imagery can be discovered when Pepe is getting back. Pepe sees his endured little shack and notification the shadow. The shadow is traveling toward the path Northeast. Despite the fact that the bearings North and east are acceptable, the way that the shadow is there turns them terrible. This implies underhanded is prevailing upon goodness. Thus, whichever course Pepe goes to he will fall into abhorrent. Another fine model is when Pepe watches the sun set in the West. The sun, which is the bearer of all life, is moving towards underhanded. That implies it will be dull out and Pepe's demise is soon to come. Steinbeck further uses this imagery while portraying the highest points of the trees on the mountain. The highest points of the trees were wind-chomped and dead. This represents the further Pepe goes up the mountain the closer he is to his unavoidable passing. As appeared above, bearing is another significant part of imagery. Heading is simply one more of the numerous ways John Steinbeck achieves his hinting of the closure of his story (pg. 225). As we can plainly observe, John Steinbeck has utilized numerous strategies and instances of imagery

Kants Deontology

IntroductionThe word Deon is a Greek word and it implies obligation. As per the deontological hypothesis activities aren't right or right in themselves, very inaccessible from their impact. In this hypothesis certain activities are permitted or forestalled by the contention that every one of the activity is either right or wrong as per the moral commitments. So the individuals who have confidence in utilizing a deontological hypothesis would acquire thought the fundamental rights and obligations of gatherings or people and act as per their good duties.Immanuel Kant the incredible thinker, who had lived in the eighteenth century, proposed the work which is utilized for the reference of deontology. As indicated by him every individual has got sense of pride and respect in legacy. He accepts that nobody has option to treat others in a negative manner for his own means.Kantian DeontologyKant contends that lone cooperative attitude is totally acceptable as opposed to the bliss, delight or something different. The individuals who perform awful deeds are perpetually discontent and satisfied The thing which is as per and represents the purpose of obligation is cooperative attitude. Kant implies that lone those activities have moral worth which is performed for obligation. He decides the virtue of one’s deeds by the hesitance towards his purpose of obligation implies more noteworthy one is unwilling towards the purpose of obligation, more the ethical worth of activity. Hence good obligation is free of and precedes the idea of goodnessThe cooperative attitude needn't bother with any capability for being acceptable, in this manner it is acceptable all alone. . Kant doesn't have faith in being willed well in light of the outcome being delivered by it For Kant an individual is responsible for just those things that are heavily influenced by him. Despite the fact that what we will for our deeds is inside the intensity of us yet the aftereffects of our demonstrations a re definitely not. Similarly regardless of whether more negative outcomes are created by the activities of an individual of positive attitude, he merits praise.Kant proposes that cooperative attitude is just acted exclusively by the correct expectation. The aim of cooperative attitude is for obligation. The various expectations for activities are either carrying on of personal circumstance or for obligation or acting through tendency. For understanding the distinction among the various aims for the activities being performed, relate this to the corporate world case of a sales rep at any association whose clients are fulfilled and he has altruism. (Karl, 1982)This is on the grounds that he has never been exploitative to his clients and customers, since he has never cheated to those clients and customers who are unpracticed. Presently there can be three purposes behind him frankly. Right off the bat he treats really in view of a serious rivalry in his association. He imagines that on the off chance that he would be really legit with his clients, they would not go to his rivals and would in this way want to work with him accordingly he would be granted by the association. So in this he is straightforward as a result of personal circumstance and not for the obligation and for Kant this demonstration isn't the ethical demonstration since it is performed for personal circumstance as opposed to the duty.Another explanation behind him to be straightforward is because of a tendency. This implies he gets joy from his trustworthiness which has fallen into place without a hitch for him and as indicated by Kant such sort of activities which are performed because of tendency, are likewise shameless. This is on the grounds that the tendency is totally temperamental and nonsensical, and is followed in view of its whim not as a result of its explanation. These equivalent emotions from which we are roused and perform kind acts may likewise motivate us to play out the heartless and pitiless acts. That is the reason tendency is questionable. (Karl, 1982)Thus as per Kant, the individual who acts sincerely in light of the fact that he believes that it is his obligation paying little mind to his tendencies to play out those capacities, that is an individual of goodwill So the individuals who are liberal yet nature however help the poor due to their inner sentiment of being pity are not carrying on ethically, as opposed to those being parsimonious and help for obligation. The later ones are acting ethically For Kant the need of carrying on of regard for general law is obligation. The individual who acts builds up the good and moral value.The fundamental good guideline as indicated by Kant is the Categorical Imperative a basic is only a commitment or order. The idea of an all out basic is not the same as that of theoretical objective and can be better and can be comprehended in its complexity. A speculative basic includes those activities which are acted so as to achieve different objectives But it doesn't includes those activities whom one couldn't care less for accomplishing the objectives. .The primary differentiation of straight out basic is that it just underscores the proper behavior regardless of the outcome or objective one may achieveâ â Kant accepts that an all out basic is the place, when there is a basic standard of profound quality. This is on the grounds that the moral and good motivations rule different reasons and causes.â For instance an association has a self intrigued motivation to swindle its clients by making lower quality items however on the off chance that profound quality is grounded in an all out goal, at that point it’s moral.But if ethical quality is grounded in a downright basic than the ethical reason against conning the clients rules oneself intrigued cause. . The plans of Kant’s Categorical Imperative are that we ought to consistently treat ourselves as well as other people at closes not for your methods for our finishes. Proverb is a standard on which we act enthusiastically. Kant holds that perform just those sayings which consistently will to be an all inclusive law. (Howard, 1995)These details are utilized by Kant for various expressive ways for same fundamental standard of regard and incentive for other people, They are not interchangeable but rather can be utilized for communicating the equivalent in that every plan causes one to act in a similar way. The main plan holds that people ought to be treated as creatures that have characteristic worth methods they have esteem which is free of their value for any purpose.It rejects utilizing an individual for one’s own motivation. Be that as it may, it reveals to us that one ought to never utilize an individual simply as a way to your own finishes. This implies on the off chance that somebody is eager to accomplish our work than that is satisfactory however in the event that he is constrained that is unscrupu lous so we ought not hoodwink others in doing our will. All out Imperative denies impulse and misdirection. In impulse or misleading others, we abuse their will and disturb their autonomy.The second definition licenses to perform just those activities whose proverb can turn into a general law of nature. One following up on proverb requires the trial of universalization with the goal that everybody can follow up on it. It isn't important that a specific adage ought to consistently be a general law however it must be applied on an all inclusive premise, just that is ethically passable. This can be identified with the corporate work world in the manner that if a worker working in an association misdirects everybody by bamboozling his manager and by not playing out his capacities well reasoning that what he is doing, is right.If his thought processes are acceptable then he breezes through the primary assessment of deontology, yet on the off chance that he applies all his above talked ab out activities on an all inclusive premise that everybody would begin conning then would this tricking work? Obviously not, for the explanation that cheating relies upon double dealing. Individuals would not be deluded in the event that they are required to be cheated. So for Kant and his Categorical Imperative cheating is ethically off-base. So it is must to conclude that saying can be applied on a general scale. In the event that it can, at that point the activity is regarded to be acceptable, in the event that it can't, at that point the activity is esteemed to be ethically bad.Corporations have profoundly formalized dynamic structures since they are social gatherings and they need to keep in concern the advantages of the individuals present in their inside just as outside condition and affect the religions and choices and convictions of the people who are individuals from the enormous scope enterprise. So as per Kant corporate goals can't be decreased to the individual membersâ €™ total choices. Truth be told, all the choices must be applied on general premise which are ethically worthy. Accordingly the people have the ability to change the course of the corporate character by holding their capacity, given that adequate number concurs on that change which is required. (Howard, 1995)ReferencesAmeriks, Karl. (1982) Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Caygill, Howard. (1995) A Kant Dictionary. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell Reference. ISBN 0-631-17534-2, ISBN 0-631-17535-0

Aslan, Reepicheep, Mr. Tumnus, High King Peter, King Edmund, Queens Lucy and Susan, and the White Witch. If you don’t yet know these characters, you’ll be in for a huge treat as you encounter them for the first time while working through IEW’s Following Narnia theme-based books. The Chronicles of Narnia is one of the most beloved literary series ever written. C.S. Lewis’ riveting tales have delighted children and adults for more than sixty years. The series is also a favorite of IEW author Laura Bettis, who created two theme-based writing lesson books, teaching students the IEW Structure and Styleâ„ ¢ Writing Method while they enjoy reading the classic stories of Narnia. We recently spoke with Laura about her IEW journey and her books. Can you tell us about yourself and your family? I’ve been married to my husband Craig for twenty-three years and we have three boys. Jeremy is twenty-two, and he is currently serving in the army. Kyle is sixteen and a lifeguard. Joey is fourteen and likes learning how to program in Java. We were a military family for years and years, so we moved around a lot. Homeschooling really made sense. Now we’re in Virginia, and we’ve been here for about thirteen years. When and how did you discover IEW's Structure and Style? We were homeschooling for a while, and writing was an area that I really did not know how to teach. I knew the kids weren’t getting good writing instruction. In 2008, I was hired to teach a writing class at a co-op, and they were using IEW. I spent the spring watching Teaching Writing: Structure and Style, doing the assignments, and learning how to teach. After going through it, I realized, ‘Wow this is really easy, and I can do this!’ That’s how I got started teaching IEW. When did you first get the idea for Following Narnia? In 2010, there was a Writing Educator’s Symposium. We drove to North Carolina for it, and Andrew Pudewa was the main speaker. I listened to Andrew’s talk â€Å"Fairy Tales and the Moral Imagination†, and it showed me there is so much more you can do with IEW. I had a conversation with Andrew, and he mentioned that IEW needed more literature. I went home and starting writing lessons. Ideas started coming and I thought that maybe I could be doing this with my kids. He was coming to our area again in 2011, so I put something together and showed it to him. I even drew the pictures in the book myself. Laura recently revised the first book, which is now titled Following Narnia: The Lion’s Song. The second volume has now been released, Following Narnia: Aslan’s Country. Both books are designed for Level B students and assume previous IEW experience, but the second volume is a bit more advanced. Together, the two volumes cover the entire seven volumes of C.S. Lewis’ Narnia world. What was exciting to you about writing Following Narnia Volume 2? It’s got three of my favorite books out of the seven. It was great to be able to go through my personal favorites and come up with creative writing assignments for the kids to do. I think there are a lot of assignments that are going to be a joy. There are things for both the girls and the boys in there, for sure. What is your favorite unit to teach? Well my favorite has always been Unit 5. It’s funny when people say that it’s not their favorite because I think it’s the perfect blend of structure and creativity. I could spend all year doing Unit 5. I was able to really pull out some scenes from the Narnia books and the students were able to rewrite those scenes. The students are free to change it if they want—it’s just a picture. It doesn’t have to be about Narnia. It could be about almost anything. What is the biggest advantage for students using IEW's method? The biggest advantage is that even if they don’t like writing, they learn to have confidence in their abilities. They realize with IEW they can do their assignments. It’s bite-size increments that build a student’s toolbox. They can use those tools for different assignments, and they have the confidence to do it. What is most rewarding about being an IEW author? Just helping those children and even those moms. For myself, not knowing how to write was what made writing the one thing I avoided. I didn’t know how to teach my kids to write a paper properly, much less a story or anything else. I think giving those moms the confidence and the freedom to be able to teach something like writing is so important. And really it’s so important to all of our subjects. Writing is everywhere, even outside of a ‘real writing class.’ Helping those families is the most rewarding thing to me personally. What would be the most exciting comments you could hear from parents and students? Well I’ve heard it many times, but it’s that they now love writing. They, by the end, not only have improved and recognized this improvement, but it has changed their whole mindset.    If your students have been introduced to IEW’s Structure and Style, and you love Lewis’ land of Narnia, pick up one of Laura’s theme-based writing lesson books and prepare to be delightfully challenged. Your students’ imaginations will soar as they meet unique characters like the talking beasts of Narnia, and their writing skills will soar as they incrementally learn IEW’s nine structural models and stylistic techniques.

Security Defence Policy

Sample details Pages: 21 Words: 6443 Downloads: 5 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Statistics Essay Did you like this example? Chapter I The History and Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy Since its beginnings with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Union has moved far beyond economic ideas of a single market, a single currency or the removal of all trade barriers. The European Union has become more and more politically integrated as member states place a growing number of policy areas previously held nationally in the hands of the supranational and intergovernmental institutions of the European Union. While prior attempts to bring security and defence issues or foreign policy matters into a European Union framework were largely ineffective, the last ten years have shown an important shift in these areas, leading the European Union to adopt not only a Common Foreign and Security Policy but also a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as a concise European Union Security Strategy. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Security Defence Policy | Politics Dissertation" essay for you Create order This dissertation will argue that while the European Union is becoming increasingly integrated in areas pertaining to defence and has produced a framework for a Common Security and Defence Policy, serious shortcomings prevent the CSDP from becoming an effective military tool in the near to medium future.Over the past 60 years, the European countries have worked to agree a common framework and a common policy on defence.Now the EU must back the rhetoric and institutions which have emerged from this cooperation with capabilities. This thesis will argue that there is a substantial gap between current European defence capabilities and its aspirations in the field and explain which underlying factors contribute to this gap, despite clear rhetorical commitments to the Common Security and Defence Policy.This gap will need to be overcome if the EU wants to realise its ambitions.It will contrast European Union defence aims, as expressed in European Union publications, with actual European Union defence capabilities and institutions and experiences in the field.This thesis will also analyse whether more fundamental differences regarding strategy or political unwillingness to commit to military action add to the capabilities-aspirations gap. The conditions for a common defence policy are almost as good as after the Second World War, due to the progressive retreat of US forces from Europe, and the deeper integration between European countries.The reduction of US military personnel in Europe could lead EU member states to take security more into their own hands as reliance on US protection becomes less assured.This does not mean that the US is abandoning Europe but rather that US strategic and geopolitical interests have shifted away from Europe. This is illustrated by the substantial reduction of US troops stationed in Europe.Due to the size and state of European forces, coordinated and joint efforts to ensure Europes security make more sense from a financial and a security perspective than if for example Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands or Austria each had armies aimed at guaranteeing their own security (which they cannot do effectively anyway). This thesis will assume that cooperation and durable peace between EU member states is a given.In this context, the EU has formulated its Defence and Security policy, which is arguably Europes most ambitious project of integration as security has traditionally been an area that has remained under the control of national governments and therefore only reaches an intergovernmental mode of cooperation at the EU level.Nevertheless, the CSDP has set relatively clear goals for itself, which go beyond mere ideas of achieving a defence pact such as NATO.In fact, the CSDP appears to concentrate on the Petersberg tasks[1] leaving territorial defence completely in the realm of NATO and of the member states. These goals include, but are not limited to, bringing stability to the Unions periphery, becoming a more persuasive and active global player, to improve European military capabilities to such a level as to allow the EU to take on the first two tasks, to build a comprehensive crisis management policy including civilian elements and finally to establish a common strategic culture in Europe that would bring the geopolitical objectives of EU member states closer together. However, despite excellent conditions to achieve these objectives and a global and European environment favouring the development of a defence policy, the CSDP fails to establish the conditions necessary to the realisation of its own ambitions laid out in chapter two.This work will demonstrate where the greatest discrepancies between aspirations and realities lie and where the CSDP and its participating member states lack the most.These areas will mostly mirror the ambitions that were analysed in the second chapter, in essence, the modernisation of armies, the development of adequate capabilities for the strategic goals the EU has set itself and the development of a common strategic culture.The third chapter will also analyse the conditions underlying the difficulties, which have to be overcome in order to fulfill the ambitions, for example, the lack of a single market in defence matters in the Union or the lack of political will to integrate defence competencies.A case study will il lustrate how these deficiencies translate into the theatre of operation and what lessons can be learned from the missions undertaken for the CSDP. The relationship with NATO is also important in understanding the limits or at least obstacles the CSDP might encounter before reaching the dimensions it aims to achieve.One must therefore understand whether NATO and the CSDP are mutually exclusive, competing against each other or even complementing each other.Does the CSDP progress when NATO regresses and vice versa?Which organisation will remain the preferred organisation for self-defence on the one hand and force projection operations on the other hand? Is a work-sharing scenario likely where NATO would take on high-end military operations whereas CSDP would focus on low-end military operations and civilian missions?The fourth chapter will argue that while NATO has weakened politically in recent years, it will certainly not be done away with.One may however argue that the creation of a European Pillar within NATO is becoming more likely.The role Canada has played and could play in the CSDP will also be discussed.This dissertation will argue that Canada often finds itself between a rock and a hard place in NATO and that it should allow itself some flexibility for working with both NATO and the CSDP, separately if necessary.The security values Canada traditionally shares with Europe could help to be the common ground to establish a permanent link between Canadas armed forces and the CSDP. Overview of the Chapters The first chapter broadly examines the history of European defence and security cooperation and its institutions since 1945 and looks more specifically at the period from the Saint-Malo summit of 1998 to now, as the Saint-Malo agreement between France and the United Kingdom effectively led to the Common Security and Defence Policy in its current form.This includes examining relevant treaties, agreements and summits of this period in order to give an account of how the current legal and institutional framework came about. A historical perspective is relevant, because it provides insight into the dynamics of European politics, which are hindering the development of a single strategic culture.It also provides the reader with background and historical information regarding European politics and the balancing of currently 27 national interests at the European Union level, which is discussed in more detail in chapters two and three. Chapter One also outlines the efforts, which have been made to back the Common Foreign and Security Policy with defence elements, i.e. the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the relationship between Foreign and Defence Policy of the EU. The second chapter focuses on the major aspirations of the Common Security and Defence Policy by analysing statements of European leaders and European Union officials during summits, as documented in press releases and European Union publications.While the 2010 Headline goals represent imminent and concrete aspirations, this thesis also assesses the objectives aspired to in the European Security Strategy, which states that the European Union needs to be more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities.[2]The second chapter, therefore, includes not only a description of the current defence institutions of the European Union, but also identifies the forum used for the majority of discussions in the defence realm. The aim of Chapter two is to provide the reader with an insight to the underlying politics and dynamics, which drive and hamper the process of European integration in general and the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy in particular.It focuses particularly on the positions and attitudes of the big three of European politics, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and includes an analysis of the traditional French preference for European Defence options and the British turnaround on the European Security and Defence Policy since Saint-Malo. The third chapter addresses the conditions that have to be met to build an operational military force for the EU.It analyses the existing institutional framework and the capabilities currently in place for the European Security and Defence Policy in order to highlight its deficiencies. Furthermore, it assesses the impact of mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and joint research and development programs of European defence firms. Chapter three also outlines the budgetary constraints that limit the development of such capabilities.It focuses on the military aspects of the CSDP as civilian aspects of international mission are largely deemed to be exceeding international standards.One should however note that the EU sees the CSDP as a combination of civilian and military crisis management tools. Chapter three also contains a case study briefly outlining the missions and operations undertaken under the European Security and Defence Policy, in order to draw lessons from these missions.The thesis takes into account which countries are in command for specific European Security and Defence Policy missions and what in fact constitutes a mission under the European Security and Defence Policy, since the military scope of some missions is not always evident.The third chapter also suggests changes to European Union security thinking and the common strategic culture of Europe that need to occur in order for the European Union to develop its defence aspirations. The fourth chapter addresses the relationship between the European Security and Defence Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.Canadas relationship with the European Security and Defence Policy will also be considered.It will argue that for the time being, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the primary defence forum, at least in terms of territorial defence and for major operations, as military missions depend largely on the military might of the United States.It examines the divide in strategic thinking in the European Union where key member states such as the United Kingdom or some Central and Eastern European Countries prefer to maintain the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations primacy, whereas others, for example France or Ireland, appear to favour a European option. However, it also explains how and why the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been regressing as an institution in Europe as European Union defence cooperation has been progressing since the end of the Cold War. It also shows that while large-scale operations remain dependent on US and thereby NATO input, military missions with limited scale can now be carried out by European forces on their own.This makes the creation of a European pillar within NATO an increasingly likely option.Chapter four also offers a section focusing on the issues and opportunities the changes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Common Security and Defence Policy present for Canada. This thesis will then conclude with an outlook to the future of European security and defence cooperation.It will address the prospects of a continued European Union cooperation and assess the impact this would have on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation framework.For this assessment, it will draw from previously made arguments and offer a concluding view of the aspiration-capabilities gap of the Common Security and Defence Policy, largely dependent on changes to the strategic culture and the security thinking of Europeans. The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community With the Berlin crisis of 1947, the separation of Germany in the late 1940s and the growth of communism worldwide, the United States concluded that all Western European states including West Germany needed to contribute more to their own defences.However, its European neighbours, in particular France, viewed West Germanys rearmament very critically.This resulted in France drafting its own plan for Europes defence, the European Defence Community (EDC). In 1950, Ren Pleven, the French President of the Council, todays equivalent of the countrys prime minister, issued a proposal for the EDC, in response to American calls for the rearmament of West Germany. The plan aimed to build a transnational European defence force as an alternative to Germanys accession to NATO. It intended to control the military strength of the new German state supranationally in proportion with possible conflicts with the Soviet bloc. The EDC parties were France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. On 27 May 1952, a treaty creating the EDC was signed.It was, however, never ratified by all parties and thus never came into effect. The plan collapsed when the French Assemble Nationale voted against its ratification. Some Gaullists feared that the EDC would infringe on Frances national sovereignty.Other conservatives had concerns about the constitutional indivisibility of the French Republic (i.e. subjecting it to some kind of supranational authority) and about the remilitarization of Germany. Communists and other leftists opposed a plan tying France to the capitalist United States, and setting it in opposition to the Soviet bloc. The absence of the United Kingdom from the EDC was also of concern to some parties. In other words, the same parties and ideologies (with the exception of some Gaullists) that opposed the EDC in 1954, opposed the European Constitution in a referendum over 50 years later.The French National Assembly voted against ratifying the EDC treaty on 30 August 1954 by a vote of 319 no to 264 yes votes.[3] Along with the above ideological issues, important disjuncture between the original Pleven Plan of 1950, and the plan of 1954 lead to its defeat. Many preferred the original plan of Pleven to the draft that went to ratification before parliament a few years later. The EDC would have established a European military, formed by troops committed to it by national forces. French, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg forces would report to their national governments under coordination of the EDC, whereas bureaucrats of the supranational EDC would control the German component.Due to fears of a remilitarised Germany, the EDC member states agreed that the German government would not have control over its own military. Interestingly, in the event that the EDC would fail, the parties agreed to allow Germany to control its own military. Since the EDC was designed as a common defence army, most countries would only have committed territorial defence forces, not capable of engaging into the expeditionary missions it envisages for the CSDP today.[4]The EDC also provided to put in place common equipment procurements. It would have had a centralised budget, arms and institutions, its structure would have been more integrated and more supranational than the EU is under the Treaty of Lisbon, even in economic matters.[5]Today, the European Union, NATO and to an increasingly limited extent the Western European Union all carry out some of the functions that were envisaged for the EDC.However, these organisations do not reach the degree of integration and supranationality the EDC would have provided for. The Western European Union After the EDC treaty failed to be ratified by the French Parliament, the Treaty of Brussels signatory countries as well as West Germany and Italy agreed to create instead a European security and defence organisation.The Western European Union would be based on the Treaty of Brussels.The 1948 Treaty of Brussels between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom was the first significant European defence treaty signed after the end of the Second World War, and was the first attempt to form an alliance to counter Communism in Europes periphery. It was originally intended as a mutual defence pact aimed at defending its signatories against a possible new German threat.However, soon after the treaty had been adopted, Western European countries began to recognise that the USSR represented a far greater threat to their security than a recovering Germany, especially since the latter was fully integrated in Western international organisations.The Western European Union however remained weak, lacking the forces, capabilities and reputation it required to be an effective institution. Already then, Europe was having difficulties in agreeing a framework and resources to build a common army on its own.Western European Union member states continued to rely on the United States to guarantee their security against the USSR in order to counter the military power of the USSR.As a result, the EU joined the US initiative to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949, together with the United States and Canada, which would consist of a system of collective defence obliging its member states to respond if any one of them were attacked.[6] Foreign and defence policy cooperation in Europe have always been closely linked as will be illustrated by a more detailed discussion of the relationship between CSDP and CFSP later in this chapter.In the late 1950s, European Community member states tried to create foreign policy cooperation through the Fouchet Plans between 1959 and 1962, which also proved unsuccessful.The creation of a basic European foreign policy was finally agreed on with the European Political Cooperation in 1970, although it only took onto its current form since the creation of the European Union in 1993. The European Political Cooperation can however be considered to have been the predecessor of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. A Revival of Foreign Policy Cooperation: The European Political Cooperation The European Political Cooperation was the mode of operation of foreign policy coordination in the European Communities until the Common Foreign and Security Policy superseded it through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the European Communities (EC) member states attempted to give the EC a foreign policy dimension, but such initiatives never left the stage of informal discussions. This changed with The Hague summit of 1969 when governments instructed their foreign ministers, to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement.[7] As a result, European foreign ministers drafted the Luxembourg / Davignon report, which put into place an informal intergovernmental consultation mechanism by which member states could achieve politics of scale.[8] The European Political Cooperation adopted the intergovernmental mode of operation proposed by the Fouchet Plans and the participation of the United Kingdom guaranteed its Atlanticist nature.This allowed the United Kingdom to influence politics at the European level even though it only joined the European Communities in 1973. The European Political Cooperation also allowed the European Commission to express its opinion in matters affecting its competence. Furthermore, the European Political Cooperation did not have the Paris-based powerful secretariat the Fouchet plans had aimed for. Some countries had been uneasy about such a secretariat, as they feared it could turn into a competitor of the European Commission. The European Political Cooperation was strengthened and amended by the Copenhagen report of 1973 and the London report of 1981. It was codified and formalised with the Single European Act of 1986. The European Political Cooperation enjoyed limited success. During the 1970s, it attempted mediating and brokering between parties in the Middle-East conflict and helped create the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the predecessor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, the organisation of the European Political Cooperation remained informal and its competencies vague. The intergovernmental mode of operation often proved stifling, thereby limiting its impact on world events. This remains a challenge to European foreign policy until today. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the handling of the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 to 1995 exposed the weaknesses of the European Political Cooperation.[9]The Yugoslav wars triggered a renewed discussion, and eventually a complete break with past positions of the EU on a common European involvement in Foreign and Defence policy, as European countries failed to prevent or even manage the first Balkan crisis, just beyond its borders.The Yugoslav wars effectively led to the creation of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy, as Europeans saw that the European Political Cooperation was insufficient to coordinate common foreign policy action, while each member state was unwilling to get involved individually in the conflict.The European Political Cooperation never reached the dimensions of the European Defence Community or todays Common Foreign and Security Policy, since most military components remained with the Western European Union and because foreign policy competencies remain ed in the hands of the EC and defence policy competencies in the hands of the Western European Union. The Treaty of Maastricht In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht brought about a new framework to EU external action and to the EU in general.With the end of the Cold War, NATOs original function, the defence against the Soviet Bloc and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. For the US, the collapse of the Soviet Union clearly reduced the centrality of Europe to its security policy as the reduction of its forces permanently stationed in Europe over the past 20 years exemplifies.[10] Other theatres outside Europe, for example the Gulf region and the Middle East gained in strategic importance for the United States. Consequently, calls from Washington for the Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own regional security grew in volume and strength. When the first conflicts across the Balkans broke out, the member states of the European Union realised that its sphere of peace and stability did not extend beyond its borders. Influenced by its inability to agree and cooperate on the Balkan wars, European Union member states signed the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, which declared the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framework of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence.[11] The Treaty further requested the Western European Union, which was now referred to as an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defence implications.[12] The WEU thereby became mostly integrated into the EU.Many functions of the Western European Union were transferred to the EU, and the Western European Union was essentially phased out over the next 10 years. In the years following the Maastricht Treaty, the Yugoslav conflict worsened.The United States resisted involvement in the Yugoslav civil war under both presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton as they considered it a European problem.European diplomatic efforts to stop the war proved unsuccessful and divisions among the EU member states increased.The United Nations forces had neither the mandate nor the capabilities to prevent the massacres in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The Dutch and with them the rest of Europe recognised after Srebrenica that the current format of a UN mandate supported and executed by NATO troops was insufficient. The Europeans turned to its transatlantic allies again, which reluctantly agreed to lead NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1995. The American intervention was considered an emergency measure Europeans could and should not rely on again in the future.The conflict showed how dependent Europe remained on US military assets and how problematic this dependence was, when the United States was reluctant to get involved in a conflict Europeans had a stake in. Because of their military dependence on the US, the European NATO members decided to create a European pillar within the framework of NATO, which they hoped would strengthen Europes political cohesion and military capabilities. NATO itself was undergoing a process of reform and redefinition triggered by the end of the Cold War, which not all of its members were convinced it would survive. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam brought about consensus among EU member states that a common European policy on security and defence matters should be incorporated into the EU framework.The EU and its members had realised that the framework of the Treaty of Maastricht required further adjustments, especially in terms of foreign policy.The Amsterdam Treaty provided for the progressive framing of a common defence policy and, more importantly, incorporated the Petersberg Tasks into the legal framework of the EU. The Petersberg tasks are humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks to be carried out by armed forces that the European Union is empowered to do with recourse to a United Nations mandate.They had been defined at the Petersberg Hotel near Bonn by the Western European Union Council in June 1992. The member states agreed to deploy the whole spectrum of their military and resources under the authority of the Western European Union in approved circumstances or events.As a part of the merger of the Western European Union with the European Union, the Petersberg tasks now form a part of the European Security and Defence Policy.The adoptions of the provisions contained in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Petersberg tasks were both significant steps in the evolution of the CSDP, but their importance should not be overstated. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties provided only the framework for an emerging European security and defence policy. The continued reliance on the United States and the bleak European response to the Yugoslavian crisis stressed the need to add substance to this framework. Saint-Malo For half a century, the different attitudes of Britain and France towards serious European defence and security cooperation acted as a substantial obstacle to its development.While France believed that the creation of a capability-backed European defence project would lead to a more balanced and therefore stronger Atlantic Alliance, Britain feared that the opposite would be the case.It was worried that Washington would retreat from Europe and abandon NATO.However, the example of Yugoslavia and Kosovo made the Europeans realise that the United States would not pay their bail in every case. Even the new British Prime Minister Tony Blair had become convinced that the US was no longer willing to play the role of Europes peacemaker, unless Europe took more responsibility towards it own security.As Blair explained, We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own backyard.[13] The British Strategic Defence Review of 1998 reflected this view, stressing the vital role of the EU, notably through the Common Foreign and Security Policy.[14]In the view of many Europeans, this also entailed that NATO was not the adequate forum of dealing with international matters, let alone some of the Petersberg tasks.For some, NATO was limited to being a territorial defence alliance, and the void created by new security conditions of extra-territorial defence had to be filled by other means. At the climax of the Kosovo crisis, Prime Minister Blair met with his French counterpart Jacques Chirac in Saint-Malo in December 1998.In a joint declaration, the UK and France stressed that the European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises.[15]The ability to achieve these tasks, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so were deemed necessary for the EU to be able to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.[16] At first, the Saint-Malo declaration only appeared to be an attempt to speed up the process of implementing what had been agreed upon at the Amsterdam summit on the Foreign and Security Policy in 1997, namely, the progressive framing of a common defence policy.[17]However, the declaration also appeared to move beyond such statements. While it honoured the collective defence provisions of NATOs Article five, it did not mention in any way the Berlin-Brussels agreements on NATOs implicit primacy and the notion that there should not be a duplication of NATO for tasks falling outside of Article five such as in Kosovo. The explicit idea of a European Defence policy within the NATO framework that could make use of separable but not separate military capabilities was also absent. The omission of either of these key issues was unprecedented and therefore a significant redirection of European defence and security politics. The declaration also asserted that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action (emphasis added).[18]The inclusion of the word autonomous in this declaration was highly significant since it had never been used before in such a context. France understood autonomous in the sense that the European defence initiative should be independent of NATO.Britain however interpreted the word as meaning that the European defence project could develop autonomously but only under the umbrella of NATO.Whereas for France, European security and defence policy should be mainly a European project, assuming a readiness, when necessary, to make use of NATO assets, for the UK, such cooperation was seen as the best means of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance only with a stronger and more coordinated European presence While the British Prime Ministers willingness to sign the Saint-Malo Declaration may well have derived in part from his desire to boost Britains role in the EU after its non-accession to the Euro, Prime Minister Blair certainly believed that a move towards enhanced European military capabilities would reduce American criticism about inadequate burden-sharing in international operations, which had intensified during the Kosovo conflict.[19] The Saint-Malo Declaration was adopted bilaterally and outside the EU framework, without first consulting other EU member states or discussing the matter with them. However, it was agreed upon by the two most important European states in military matters and two states holding different views of NATO, the transatlantic relationship and the role of the EU in the world. Perhaps most important was that the Saint-Malo declaration was agreed upon with little or no advance notice to anyone and that it was agreed at the summit level, thereby giving it more political weight than anything else done since the Berlin-Brussels agreement on developing a European Defence Policy.[20]Shortly after the Saint-Malo Declaration, at the June 1999 Cologne European Council meeting, the EU member states built on the declaration to reach an unprecedented level of agreement on the establishment of a European security and defence policy. Germany, who held the EU Presidency at the time, considerably contributed to this success, re-affirming the dynamic trio spearheading most EU actions. During the Cold War, West Germany had restricted its participation in NATO operations to logistical and financial assistance. It had justified this limited participation through its constitution, which prohibited the use of the Bundeswehr for any purpose other than self-defence according to interpretations by the German Federal Constitution Court. Following the re-unification of Germany in 1990, NATO out-of-area operations and US criticism of Germanys refusal to take part in military action during the 1991 Gulf War grew. German policy-makers were compelled to reconsider the circumstances under which military forces should or could be deployed. Eventually, in 1994 the Federal Constitution Court ruled that the Bundeswehr could participate in military operations conducted within the framework of organisations of collective security or collective defence to which Germany belonged, such as NATO, the UN or the EU provided the Bundestag gave its authorisation.This created for the German government and for German public opinion a radically different set of political and legal assumptions under which to consider the evolution of CSDP and allowed Germany to play a more active role in the shaping of a European dimension of defence and security alongside France and the UK.[21]Even more interesting is the fact that the first major mission approved by the German Bundestag, the mission in Kosovo in 1999, was agreed to under a government of self-proclaimed pacifists (at least the Green Party ran at the time on a pacifist platform).This new stance of Germany also carried over into the EU sphere and can be seen by examining the conclusions of the Cologne council in 1999. The Cologne Council conclusions state that The European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy of security and defence. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.[22] While this repeats more or less the content of the Saint-Malo declaration, it does take the latter to the European level, making it the first European declaration on defence free of a direct NATO context.It is at this point that the framework which this essay is based on was agreed on and put into place.The table on the following page illustrates how the different frameworks have evolved over the past six decades and how foreign policy and defence policy have become more integrated and more consolidated in recent years. One should note the transition from a number of European communities to the European Union with its pillar structure and the successive reduction of the WEU.The Treaty of Lisbon will bring about the removal of the pillar structure, a further expansion of EU competencies into the foreign and defence policy realm, with the latter being to the detriment of the Western European Union. From CFSP to ESDP In order to understand the workings of the Common Security and Defence policy, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, since the former is closely linked to the latter.Foreign policy has traditionally been more discussed in the EU since the failure of the European Defence Community than defence matters, partly because of the sensitivity of the issue, partly because of the existence of the Western European Union and because most EU/EC member states were committed to NATO.However, the Treaty of Amsterdam substantially reshaped the foreign policy framework of the EU although it did not yet include clear provisions for a defence policy. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on the European Union are devoted specifically to the CFSP.Since then, Title V of the Treaty states that A common foreign and security policy is hereby established, to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to promote good governance and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.[24] These goals are, however, only foreign policy statements, not security goals and the institutional tools, such as the Troika format (Representatives from the current and future EU Presidency, the Commission and the Council), the High Representative for the Foreign Policy or Joint Actions, put at the disposal of the Council Secretariat were limited to economic and diplomatic measures. The harshest possible actions the EU could impose at the time were economic embargos. Following the Saint-Malo summit a few months earlier, the implementation of an independent European security and defence policy was agreed at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The CSDP was defined at the time as the establishment of credible operational capabilities on which the CFSP could rely.Its aim was to give the CFSP a crisis management component and to give the CFSP more muscle in international crises.[25]The Treaty of Nice of 2003 added further changes to the CFSP framework and its treaty provisions.The Treaty of Lisbon continued to alter the CFSP and CSDP and its modus operandi. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the CSDP is considered an integral part of the CFSP. As such, the CSDP gives the EU the option of using both civilian and military capabilities for conflict prevention and international crisis management. The combination of civilian and military measures is at the core of the reasons why CFSP and CSDP are linked closely.As stated in most major documents concerning the CSDP, including the European Security Strategy, the EU intends to be able to deploy the whole package of crisis management tools and to provide a framework that would allow civilian and military elements to operate symbiotically in the field.The CSDP allows for a broader range of capabilities, action and intervention for the CFSP in particular and international or external relations in general. The same principles and procedures that apply to the CFSP govern the CSDP, which uses special additional tools, such as the European Union Military Staff, the Military Committee and specialized agencies such as the European Defence Agency, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter two.It is also noteworthy that decisions on the CSDP are being made by the foreign ministers or the heads of states and not by defence ministers who do however hold preparatory meetings and an advisory role.One should also note that the role of the Commission in the CFSP has increased since the creation of the CSDP because the commission retains certain competencies in regards to civilian missions of the defence policy.

Ancient Rome And Ancient China - 939 Words

Ancient Rome and Ancient China were two different civilizations with very different yet very similar ways of life. Culture, religion, and more importantly, politics, helped make life the way it was for those who lived in ancient rome and ancient china. Politics were what made everything function, just as it does today. Politics is what was responsible for the wars that took place between civilizations, and why dynasty’s fell and why new ones rose right after. Politics were the backbone holding up each civilization. Due to China and Ancient Rome rising during separate times, their rulers, the laws the had to be followed, and how social ranking affected politics. Many things were different between Ancient Rome and Ancient China The first†¦show more content†¦The leadership roles that started out these civilizations were very different and some more influential than others. In Ancient China and in Ancient Rome the law, just as the politics were different. In Ancient Ch ina some of the laws were respecting your parents, and others were the penalties for committing crimes, such as death from robbery. In China unlike rome, the women weren’t treated that well. A law for women was, If a girl insulted her parents he would be strangled. Some other punishments in the law were very intense, such as burning the cheeks of criminals which would leave a scar the rest of their lives. Many of the crimInal Ancient Rome the laws were under The Twelve Tables. The laws included in The Twelve Tables were much more strict and supposed to be â€Å" an eye for an eye† which meant that the punishment for the crime was supposed to be equal to itself. Some laws included were Marriages should not take place between plebeians and patricians, If the theft has been done by night, if the owner kills the thief, the thief shall be held to be lawfully killed, and If anyone summons a man before the magistrate, he must go. If the man summoned does not go, and let the one summoning him call the bystanders to witness and then take him by force. Rome would bribe many people with a citizenship in exchange for their loyalty for the ruler and for the law.Show MoreRelatedComparing The Great Ancient Figures Of Ancient China And Rome1171 Words   |  5 Pagespresentation on why Ancient History is a great riveting subject to do in your senior years of education. This will be done through the comparison of two great ancient figures of ancient China and Rome. You will learn how the history of the great’s impact the modern society we see today, as Theodore Roosevelt once said ‘the more you know about the past, the better prepared you are for the future’. (Next slide) Spartacus The first ancient figure I will be talking about hails from Ancient Rome and was one ofRead MoreWomen of Ancient Rome and China Essay2040 Words   |  9 PagesWomen of Ancient Rome and China Women in ancient Rome and China were very different but quite similar as for as their treatment and roles were concerned. In both cultures they were under the protection of their fathers until they married. When they married they were to stay home and be wives, they were not formally educated and learned to manage their households. They were not allowed to disgrace their families in any way and were inferior to men from the moment of birth. Chinese women whetherRead MoreWomen of Ancient Rome China805 Words   |  4 PagesThe empires of Rome and China were very great ones, they both had many similarities and differences in the way they ran their empires. One major difference was the way they treated their women. Both Chinese and Roman women were unequal in social status than the men of the empires were, but they were definitely treated different in both empires. Women of China were treated quite harshly and were expected to take orders at all times by their husbands, and were to ser ve them always. This started toRead MoreDifferences in Ancient Rome and Han China944 Words   |  4 PagesHan China and Classical Rome When comparing Han China and Classical Rome, many political, geographical, and religious similarities can be found, though many differences are also prevalent. Though Roman and Han political structures both emphasized bureaucracies, they came to them quite differently. Through copious amounts of expansion, both societies spread culture and earned money, though expansion was eventually their downfalls. Their religions differed immensely, with Rome emphasizing polytheismRead MoreClassical Civilizations of Ancient Greece, Rome, and China Essay897 Words   |  4 Pagesthere have been many civilizations, empires, colonies, and tribes that have impacted the world. The civilizations of Greece, Rome, and China have done this, but what sets them apart from the others is their lasting significance and lasting impact they had on the world. For this reason, they are considered classical civilizations. To describe how Greece, Rome, and Han China are classical, there are three systems that are u sed; these are Economic, Social, and Political. Out of these three classicalRead MoreAn Analysis of Art in Ancient China, Rome, and Northern Europe2290 Words   |  9 PagesAn Analysis of Art in Ancient China, Rome, and N. Europe Introduction One thing is permanent about art throughout the ages and civilizations of time: it always expresses some aspect of the culture that produced it. So it may be seen in Renaissance Italy in Michelangelos David, or in Hellenistic Greece in the Dying Gaul. The Egyptian statue of Anubis reveals something about the spiritual belief of those ancient people, and the abstract expressionism of Kandinsky in the 20th century representsRead MoreWomen Of The Roman Empire1022 Words   |  5 PagesIn the Roman Empire, and in most ancient societies, the role and status of woman has been obscured by the bias of ancient male writers. Just as women are viewed in ancient Greece, and Imperial China, women in the Roman Empire were viewed as inferior to men. In the Roman Empire it was believed that women should be under the control of a guardian, which controls the aspects of her life. This guardian could be her father, husband, or a male relative (Nystrom). Marriage in the Roman Empire was not romanticRead MoreChina vs. Rome Compare and Contrast1390 Words   |  6 PagesChina and Rome China and Rome were astonishing civilizations that managed to advance technology and civilations. Both civilizations were rapidly growing and making changes to the world. The two cultures were pretty similar, yet very different. Their religions were something to be modest about. When it came to religion it helped the decline of both societies, by religion changing. When it came to technology though, its change is what caused the societies to flourish. As for education the bothRead MoreAttitudes of War in Ancient Civilizations1039 Words   |  5 Pageswar in both ancient Rome and China. These attitudes prove that in these cases perhaps it is safe to say that wars are not inevitable or natural but were caused by warlike societies and social situations. 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Salmon Essay Example For Students

Salmon Essay What species would travel over 2000 miles just to have young and then die? Ithas been said that anyone who has not seen a wild salmon has not seen what afish should be. Salmon was the common name applied to fish characterized by anelongated body covered with small, rounded scales and a fleshy fin between thedorsal fin and tail. In this paper I will be discussing history of studyingsalmon, the life cycle, spawning and mating behaviors; which has much to do withthe total reproduction of salmon. Salmon were studied earlier than some maythink. Experiments were done by men that date back to the mid-1600s. Theseexperiments involved catching salmon in fresh water, tagging them, and thencatching them again when they return to the same place, around six months later. These experiments were doubtful and it was not until the beginning of the1900s that proof was available that the salmon returned home. (Shearer)Although usually drab in color before the breeding season, which varies with thespecies, members of the salmon family develop bright hues at spawning time. Themale, during this mating season, usually develops a hooked snout and a humpedback. In many diverse taxa, males of the same species often exhibitmultiple mating strategies. One well-documented alternative male reproductivepattern is female mimicry, whereby males assume a female-like morphology ormimic female behavior patterns. In some species males mimic both femalemorphology and behavior. We report here female mimicry in a reptile, thered-sided garter snake (Thamnophis sirtalis parietalis). This form of mimicry isunique in that it is expressed as a physiological feminization. Courting malered-sided garter snakes detect a female-specific pheromone and normally avoidcourting other males. However, a small proportion of males release a pheromonethat attracts other males, as though they were females. In the field, matingaggregations of 5-17 males were observed formed around these individualattractive males, which we have termed she-males. In competitive matingtrials, she-males mated with females significantly more often than did normalmales, demonstrating not only reproductive competence but also a possibleselective advantage to males with this female-like pheromone. In thecompetitive mating trials, the she-males were successful in 29 out of 42 trials. The normal males won out in only 13! The authors ask the question: Why arentall males she-males given such an advantage? (Mason, Robert T., and Crews,David; Female Mimicry in Garter Snakes, Nature, 316:59, 1985.)Comment. Among the fishes, bluegills and salmon (and probably many others) havefemale-appearing males competing with normal males. Abstract: The influence ofsperm competition and individual mating behaviour in an externally fertilizingspecies of fish, the Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), is estimated from videoobservations of multiple-male spawnings and subsequent paternity analyses. Onemale dominated the paternity during polygamous spawnings, fathering more than80% of the progeny in a single nest. Behavioural analyses of the spawningsshowed that the first-mating male had sperm precedence in 6 out of 10 cases. Inthree of the other spawnings, sperm limitation likely influenced individualsuccess, as the first-mating male had participated in a large number ofspawnings. In the fina l, nearly simultaneous spawning, male size was moreimportant than the 0.6-s difference in spawning times. Thus, male fertilizationsuccess can be influenced by a variety of factors, including sperm precedence,male size, and spawning history. Back to Table of Contents Before mating, oneparent excavates a nest for the eggs; after the eggs are deposited andfertilized, the female stirs up the stream bottom so that earth and stones coverthe eggs and protect them. The eggs hatch in two weeks to six months, dependingon the species and the water temperature. During the migrations andnest-building activity that precede mating, neither the females nor the malesconsume food. In the life cycle of the pacific salmon, nature recycles theparents to feed the babies. Mature salmon leave the Pacific Ocean as saltwaterfish, never again to eat as they battle their way up the Columbia River to spawnin the home stream where they were born. Those born in the upper reaches of theColumbia Rivers tributary st ream, the Snake River, travel more than 1,000 milesinland to lay their eggs and fertilize them, roughly one fourth of the distanceacross the United States. Without enough reserves in their bodies to get back tothe Pacific, the adult salmon spawn and die. To spawn, a female salmon scoops anest in stream-bottom gravel by waving her tail and deposits her eggs in thehole. The male releases milt (sperm) into the water that covers the eggs andfertilizes them. Then the female brushes gravel over the eggs, and both parentslie exhausted in the stream until they die. Micro-organisms in the waterdecompose their bodies during the winter, and this process increases thepopulation of micro-organisms in the stream. Come spring, the salmon eggs hatchinto the tiny fish called fry. The first food is the microorganismsin the stream. The Pacific salmon never see their parents, but are actuallynourished by their decomposed bodies. The next step in growth isfingerlings, then young salmon make the dangerou s trip downstream,past dams and waterfalls to the ocean. There they grow into adults, averagingsix pounds in weight. In its life cycle, the pacific salmon takes five forms andsizes: a pea-sized egg, one-half-inch embryo, one- to three-inch fry, four- tofive-inch fingerling, and fully grown, six-pound adult one to two feet long. Women Rights | | EssayBibliography1. Mills, Derek. (1989). Ecology and Management of Atlantic Salmon. NewEngland, New York: Chapman and Hall. 2. Shearer. (1978). The Atlantic Salmon. New York: Halsted Press form 3. Cone, J., ; Ridlington, S. (Eds.). (1996)The Northwest Salmon Crisis: A documentary History. Corvallis, Oregon: OregonState University Press.

Tuesday, February 15, 2000 Essays - Misconduct, Academic Dishonesty

Tuesday, February 15, 2000 Focus on Ethics Can Curb Cheating, Colleges Find Behavior: Academic dishonesty is rampant, but students will respond to higher standards of integrity, a study shows. By KENNETH R. WEISS, Times Education Writer Copyright 2000 Los Angeles Times DAVIS, Calif.--Grappling for ways to halt the spread of plagiarism and other cheating in college, professors often get stuck on the idea that it's too late to change students' behavior by the time they reach college. But a growing number of campuses, backed by new research, are out to prove otherwise. Student behavior is affected by the communities we build, said Gary Pavela, the University of Maryland's director of judicial programs and student ethical conduct. Students cheat in high school in part because the think everyone else does. But students can change their ways if colleges clearly demand honesty, engage students in ethical issues and put them in charge of enforcement, said Pavela and his colleagues at such schools as UC Davis and Kansas State University, which are in the vanguard of a new movement to change the academic culture. A new large-scale study suggests they may be right. Although a startling 68% of college students admitted in an anonymous survey last fall that they engaged in some form of serious cheating, self-reported cheating was 10 percentage points lower on campuses that simply make a big fuss about academic integrity. The rates dipped even lower at colleges with formal honor codes. The survey results, which are to be released this week, are the first indication that anti-cheating campaigns are making inroads at the large public universities where many professors fear a spreading epidemic of academic dishonesty. The results directly challenge the broad view that a kid's ethical views at age 17 or 18 are set by their parents for good or ill, Pavela said. Administrators and student leaders have cribbed ideas from smaller colleges with traditional honor codes and modified them to work on large campuses. At UC Davis, the topic of academic integrity is everywhere, brought up by the students themselves. As final exams approach each term, students give their peers free cards stamped, Honesty is the only policy, and free No. 2 pencils with the inscription: Fill in your own bubble or be in trouble. Older students do skits to show incoming freshmen what can happen if they violate the code of academic conduct. Professors and their teaching assistants regularly turn in undergraduates for the smallest of infractions. In case students somehow miss the point, every Wednesday the campus newspaper's judicial report reveals all the embarrassing details--except for names--of what one sophomore calls a parade of unbelievably stupid acts of plagiarism, improper collaboration and wandering eyes. All this attention on cheating seems to make a difference. I would never want to cheat here--it's just too scary, said Tina Valenzuela, a UC Davis senior who wants to go to veterinary school. Just the fact that if you get caught, you'd read about it in the paper. At UC Davis, only 31% of students reported that they got the questions or answers from someone else who had already taken a test before they did--one of the most common forms of cheating. By comparison, on campuses that place less emphasis on academic integrity or ignore the issue altogether, 54% of students reported getting questions or answers. A skeptic might ask if students at schools with honor codes are simply less likely to admit--even anonymously--that they have violated the rules. Donald L. McCabe, the Rutgers University management professor who conducted the newest study, part of a decade of research on the subject of cheating, thinks not. Lower cheating rates at honor code schools are validated by surveys of faculty and by students who have attended both kinds of institutions, McCabe said. McCabe's latest survey, which last fall collected the responses of 2,100 students and 1,000 faculty members at 21 campuses across the country, showed that: * Nationwide, most forms of cheating remain at or near record levels. * Men admit to more cheating than women, fraternity and sorority members more than nonmembers; students with lower grade-point averages say they cheat more than those with high GPAs. * Students pursuing degrees in journalism and communications, business and engineering reported cheating more than those in the sciences, social sciences or humanities. * Only 9.7% of students reported plagiarizing a paper in